Sometimes their lives and the lives of their families are used as collateral. DTOs invest tens of thousands of dollars for each site, depending on the number of plants and necessary infrastructure. Expensive infrastructure components include weapons, drip irritation, camp gear and mechanical equipment. Cultivators spray-paint subtle tree markings to identify campsites for re-utilization. Supplies that must be replenished annually include seed, or cloned starters, chemical inputs, food, ammunition and more. In addition, Cartels pay for travel and logistics, labor, and other variable costs. While these systems may seem both expensive and risky to establish, each harvest produces millions of dollars in profit. The wholesale value of one pound of high quality marijuana buds ranges from $1,800 to $2,000, and the market value ranges from $2,000 to $6,000.29 At these prices, marijuana is more valuable pound for pound than gold. The average number of plants for all discovered sites in 2006 was about 7,000, with each site producing between 7,000 -14,000 pounds of buds.This means that the average harvest is valued between $12.6 million and $28 million. Some outdoor plantations have contained upwards of 50,000 marijuana plants. In 2006, 346 sites were eradicated by the Forest Service in California estimated to represent only 30% to 40% of the marijuana produced within the state that year.
In an effort to capitalize on the immense returns, pipp racking system “cultivators [are] changing their cultivation process from a single planting to a two-crop planting with shortened growing cycles… this maximizes potential profits and reduces the risk of eradication.”In order to do this, cultivators plant early in the spring, or plant specific strains of Cannabis that mature and produce buds faster. This means that the harvesting season may begin as early as March, and may not end until October. Each DTO grow site supports between 5,000 and 50,000 plants and may contain advanced technological systems such as radios, alarms, scanners, night vision goggles, automated irrigation timers, chainsaws, camp equipment, and weapons. Armed guards are present at every site and carry weapons such as AR 15 assault rifles, AK-47 machine guns, hunting rifles, shotguns, and pistols. In order to provide a 24-hour watch, cultivators rotate their sleep patterns and setup early warning systems. Consequently, anybody in the near vicinity of a plantation is in extreme danger. In recent years cultivator aggression has increased, resulting in death threats, physical harassment, and gun violence. There are reports every year of vandalism to the homes of federal employees, guards firing at hunters, park visitors encountering armed Mexican nationals, law enforcement officers receiving death threats by mail and phone, and even cases of murder in remote areas. Domestic marijuana cultivation was traditionally a crime enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration and local law enforcement agencies.
As marijuana production became an increasingly prominent and dynamic phenomenon during the mid- 1980s, the governmental agencies responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 began to adapt to the changing trends. At this time, the DEA was primarily focused on addressing methamphetamine production across the United States. 34 Local police did not possess the resources or training to fully engage and repress remote cultivation efforts by international organizations. Marijuana production trends began to shift from people’s personal property onto public lands around the early 1980s. At that time, California residents began to encroach on the National Parks and successfully grow and harvest marijuana crops.The local Sheriffs could not deter this activity as it began because their time was limited by other casework, their funds were dedicated to addressing other criminal activity, their training and equipment was inadequate for remote operations, and their methods did not effectively identify, much less prevent the continuation of marijuana cultivation on private or public lands. In March 1982, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks began to recognize the potential threat posed by marijuana cultivation on federal land. The report Illegal and Unauthorized Activities on Public Lands – A Problem with Serious Implications evaluated how “crimes against persons and property, marijuana cultivation, timber thefts, and trespassing – were limiting the ability of the public to use and enjoy natural resources and recreational facilities on federal lands in California and Oregon…
The Chairman was especially concerned about the danger marijuana growers posed to federal employees and land users.”Governmental awareness of the issues facing public lands led to action that transformed the roles that various land management agencies would play in the future. In the 1983 report, Additional Actions Taken to Control Marijuana Cultivation and Other Crimes on Federal Lands, major governmental landholders were granted jurisdiction to regulate marijuana cultivation on public lands. The three principal federal land management agencies, the US Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service were all cited along with the DEA as the primary agencies responsible for addressing threats to preserve the integrity of federal lands. This meant increased law enforcement responsibilities on the part of all three agencies. The National Park Service would utilize park police and park rangers while the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management would employ special agents and enlist assistance from local and state law enforcement agencies. Cooperative efforts between the DEA, state and local law enforcement were often used to suppress domestic cultivation because they could “promote information sharing and contribute training, equipment, investigative and aircraft resources, and funding to support the efforts of state and local law enforcement agencies.”One significant result of cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies was the development of the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting. What these cooperative efforts show is that despite the increased responsibilities of federal land management agencies, outside sources were still relied upon for enforcement efforts. This is represented in Forest Service budgets that allocate a negligible amount of funds specifically for controlling marijuana cultivation. The funding allocated for marijuana control efforts by the USDA Forest Service in 1982 was $206, only increased to $1,072 in 1983.During that same period of time, the “Forest Service reimbursed state and local law enforcement agencies $5.3 million under cooperative law enforcement agreements.”This shows that while land management agencies were responsible for the preservation and protection of land, they still relied mainly on state and local officers to conduct eradication operations. This may explain why in 1982, the US Forest Service’s Pacific Southwest Region located only 114,911 plants out of an estimated 387,000 plants, and only eradicated 55,561 of those located. Initial law enforcement efforts on public lands focused exclusively on locating and eradicating marijuana plots. To accomplish this goal, cooperative law enforcement agencies assigned agents to marijuana task forces during the late summer months because the harvest season was the only time of year that marijuana plantations reached adequate maturity to be visibly spotted by helicopter reconnaissance. Helicopter searches served as the primary means of locating plantations, so officers only conducted operations during times of the year when plantations were visible from an aerial perspective. Another reason that agencies only conducted periodic drug enforcement in remote areas was that traditionally, the success of enforcement operations was measured by the number of plants and sites eradicated, illustrated by the focus of law enforcement statistics on the plant eradication count. “Generally, this approach applies the rationale, pipp vertical racks ‘the more plants eradicated, the greater the success.’ However, a more holistic view recognizes that increased plant numbers may actually reflect a failed strategy.”Short term annual operations maximized the plants eradicated for the resources dedicated, but did little to prevent the proliferation of marijuana cultivation on federal lands.
When Sheriffs raided sites for eradication, they apprehended individuals at the scene of the crime, but did not collect evidence, follow leads or conduct investigations. Eradication sometimes meant that plants were carried out in helicopter nets, but more often plants were slashed and burned or left to rot. However, officers did not enter every plantation that was visually identified due to limited budget allocation for remote operations. At the end of the eradication season, officers were transferred back to their regular assignments until eradication efforts began again in the following year. As law enforcement agencies identified the increasing occurrence of cultivation on public lands, they also began to recognize the recurrence of grower operations in areas that had been eradicated in past years. It became evident that cultivators came back to sites year after year because the site infrastructure still remained. Eradicated sites could successfully produce marijuana harvests in years following a bust because federal agencies were so limited in time, staffing and resources that re-visitation of every previously eradicated site was impossible. The implication of grower recurrence on eradicated sites was that undiscovered sites were likely utilized on a yearly basis. The establishment of DTO operations on California lands transformed the nature of law enforcement efforts to combat commercial marijuana production. While eradication efforts increased, “statistics show this approach has been less than effective. Most people that have been involved with this issue for any time agree that we cannot just eradicate our way tosuccess… Another common approach has been to use the number of arrests as a measure of success. Much like the plant count, using an increased number of arrests may also reflect a less than effective program.”When small resident groups dominated marijuana cultivation in California, the eradication of a sole plantation had major economic implications for the individuals involved. Eradication statistics were directly correlated with the success of law enforcement, with some measure of legitimacy. When larger organizations entered into domestic production, they were able to compensate for losses by creating widespread and diversified operations. Eradicated sites only accounted for a small percentage of the organizations yearly production. In the 1970’s, large eradications were responsible for cutting off the supply to an area for a period of time. Today, eradications serve to increase prices on remaining supplies. While the law enforcement community understood that their longstanding methodology was ineffective at preventing remote cultivation, the organizational structures limited their ability to revolutionize their approach. Therefore, the National Marijuana Initiative was established in 2001 by the Office of National Drug Control Policy to coordinate federal, state, and local agencies. Their goal was to reduce Cannabis cultivation in areas that produced the largest amounts of marijuana such as California.Since its conception, the NMI has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of marijuana related information between law enforcement agencies and political entities. The NMI is responsible for developing the National Drug Intelligence Center’s 2003 Marijuana Threat Assessment and the 2007 Domestic Cannabis Cultivation Assessment which compiled statistics from law enforcement agencies across the nation. Through coordination and cooperation with the widely dispersed agencies involved in marijuana control, the “NMIfunded investigations have identified drug trafficking organizations that operate marijuana grows in several western states” and helped focus enforcement efforts toward key growing areas. The NMI is a product of the long-term efforts of governmental agencies in conjunction with the short-term task forces of the 1980s. Interagency task forces such as CAMP have proven to be effective at mobilizing resources and conducting remote operations. Interagency cooperation has enabled task forces to pool funds, resources and agents to optimize strategic planning and meet government set objectives. Previously, law enforcement agencies were territorial when it came to marijuana raids because marijuana eradications increased funding and improved departmental image. Now, interagency connections and the personal relationships that result, encourage cooperative efforts instead of creating barriers to them. The NMI played a crucial role in developing a political understanding of the transformation in marijuana production, cultivation by large criminal organizations, and in doing so shifted the primary focus away from eradication. In 2005, Senator Dianne Feinstein became aware of how DTO operations were adversely affecting federal lands through congressional hearings and media coverage on the issue. In response, she held a meeting with the leaders of the DEA, US Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, CAMP and other major law enforcement authorities in order to establish new objectives to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement. Through Feinstein’s efforts and renewed support in Congress, state and individual organizations allocated more funding for a comprehensive approach to marijuana law enforcement.