My analysis builds on prior data collection efforts using IRS 990 forms from Reckhow and Snyder and Ferrare and Setari . Reckhow and Snyder collected grant-making data from the 15 largest foundations by K-12 education spending in 2000, 2005, and 2010, and coded the data by type of recipient organization. Ferrare and Setari also collected grant-making data for 15 foundations, but for the years 2009, 2012, and 2014, specifically focusing on grant-making to the charter sector. In this analysis, I focus on five foundations that, according to Ferrare and Setari’s data, disbursed the great majority of grant money to the charter sector in the period they examine. More specifically, I study foundations that spent over $10 million and disbursed more than 10 grants to charter school sector organizations across 2009, 2012, and 2014.To integrate these data with the data from the prior years, I coded the broader set of K-12 education grants identified by Reckhow and Snyder according to whether the recipient was in the charter sector. I also coded whether the recipient performed some operational role in the charter sector , and whether the recipient did policy advocacy on charter issues. Finally, drawing on newer IRS 990 forms, I identified grants to organizations in the charter sector from these five foundations for the years 2016 and 2018, and coded recipients according to their main functions in the charter sector.I first investigate grant-making to the charter school associations investigated in the prior section. As demonstrated by Figure 3,botanicare rolling benches the major foundations increased grant-making to charter school associations markedly over time. Whereas grant-making to affiliates of the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools was less than $1 million in 2005, by 2012 it had jumped to over $22 million before leveling off.
Grants remained at over $15 total through 2018. This lends support to the view that the increasedcharter school association revenues from contributions and grants demonstrated in Figure 2 was driven by a growth in philanthropic backing. I now broaden the investigation to grant-making to charter school sector organizations more generally. In 2000, the five foundations in the sample gave over $10 million in grants to schools and ancillary organizations . As demonstrated by Figure 4 grant-making on charter operations rose markedly from 2000 to 2010 before leveling off. Grantmaking on schools and operations peaked in 2010 with total expenditures of just under $150 million. Afterwards, grant money dropped—driven by less grant-making from the Gates Foundation—before rising back up in 2018. Turning to organizations involved in charter advocacy, in 2000, the amount spent by these five foundations on charter advocacy grant-making was just $1.2 million. But by 2010, this had risen more than ten times to $15 million, and by 2018 grant-making on charter advocacy exceeded $50 million. Overall, the evidence supports the notion of a shift in foundation charter strategy to greater grant-making on advocacy, versus operations, over time. In 2000, just 11 percent of total grant-making dollars from these five major foundations to the charter school sector went to organizations involved with advocacy. The percent of total funding going to advocacy remained under 15 percent through 2010. But in 2012, around 35 percent of charter sector grant-making dollars went to advocacy organizations. The percent going to advocacy remained over 25 percent also in 2014 and 2018. Evidence from semi-structured interviews clarify aspects of the shift in philanthropic strategy from charter school operations to operations plus advocacy.
Overall, I conducted interviews with eight individuals with executive-level positions at major foundations funding the charter school sector or organizations in the charter school sector supported by these foundations.Interviewees broadly emphasized the importance of foundations for providing a highly capitalized countervailing force to the financial and organizational power of teachers unions. As one long-time charter advocate said, “The important thing about foundations is they are hugely wealthy… they could take a flyer on charter schools without it occupying a big piece of their budget.” Interviewees also broadly emphasized the importance of laws enabling schools to establish for drawing support from major foundations. According to the executive for education grant making at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the foundation increased charter advocacy grant-making significantly over the course of the 2000’s as it recognized the importance of politics and policy in determining how successful charter schools would be. In addition, the founder of the New Schools Venture Fund said: “Early on it was pretty much just funding schools… it was only later that foundations got more involved in politics and policy.” Several interviewees suggested that the emergence of charter schools in early-adopting states was particularly important in pulling center-left foundations into charter policy. More conservative foundations like the Walton Family Foundation were attentive to politics earlier on, but it took having schools on the ground and advocates actively fund-raising to draw greater grant-making on charter school advocacy from the more liberal and centrist foundations.Interviewees emphasized how grant-making efforts built on themselves. According to a former executive at the Gates Foundation, decision-makers at the foundation realized, through experimentation, that the foundation’s grant-making generated a multiplier effect. Greater availability of grants for advocacy increased the number of advocacy groups forming, and these groups, once formed, would continue to apply for grants from the Gates Foundation and other large funders.
In addition, as major foundations increased their grants to charter advocacy, and more charter advocacy organizations formed, charter schools became a major topic of discussion at philanthropic meetings, which grew the pot of money for charter advocacy. This ultimately contributed to the formation of advocacy networks like the PIE Network and 50CAN. Ramping up of charter advocacy in the mid-2000’s and 2010’s was in part a response to shifts in the political environment. By 2003, charter laws had been adopted in a full 40 states. But, despite this great success, the charter movement faced serious challenges. Charter laws were passed in a “fog of enactment” —their implications for the K-12 education sector were, at the start, highly uncertain. Of particular importance, and uncertain at the time, was the degree to which charter schools would be unionized. Charter schools turned out to be very difficult to unionize, and just as the establishment of schools in leading states served as “proof of concept” for foundations to increase their involvement, it also provided the evidence teachers unions needed to intensify their opposition. This only added to the demand for the procharter advocacy funded by philanthropists. I turn first to two episodes that illustrate aspects of the politics of expanding chartering to new states after the initial wave from 1991 to 2003. Most of the states that still did not have charter laws after 2003 were in rural areas of the country . Chartering has been seen principally as an education reform that could benefit metropolitan areas with many schools among which families might choose. As a result,commercial plant racks advocates and pro-charter politicians historically spent less energy trying to pass charter laws in more rural states. One such rural state late to chartering is Alabama. Even though bordering states Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Florida adopted charter laws during the initial wave in the 90’s and early 2000’s, Alabama, did not until 2015.What is notable about the 2015 Alabama expansion is the composition of the coalition of organizations leading the effort. The pro-charter coalition included Black Alliance for Educational Options , Students .First, a new organization called Alabama Coalition for Public Charter Schools, and the Business Council of Alabama . Both BAEO and StudentsFirst were national education advocacy groups that developed—with significant philanthropic funding—as charter schools grew in other states.The Alabama Coalition for Public Charter Schools, now known as New Schools for Alabama, was a new philanthropy-funded organization that established to push for the development of a charter school sector in Alabama. Put together, the pro-charter side was a coalition of foundation-funded advocacy groups from out-of-state with local business interests—aligned largely with Republican state lawmakers. This differed from early charter expansion in the 90’s, which depended on a network of policy entrepreneurs that was able to rally support from a mix of Republican and Democratic state lawmakers. The opposing coalition, on the other hand, did not look so different. It was spearheaded by the Alabama Educators Association, an affiliate of the National Education Association . While rural Alabama is typical of late charter adopters, Washington state is not. In many ways, Washington’s political economy resembles early adopters and charter leaders like California, Minnesota, Colorado, and Massachusetts. But, unlike in these similar states, charter advocates were not able to overcome opposition from the powerful Washington Education Association and other incumbent education interests during the initial charter law wave.
It was not for lack of trying. Charter laws were introduced each year from 1995 to 1999, each time passing in the lower chamber but failing in the state Senate . A relatively modest charter law was finally passed in 2004, but it was overturned via ballot initiative later in the year. Even though they were outspent by the pro-charter side, with prominent donors including Bill Gates, Don Fisher, Jeff Bezos, and John Walton, the anti-charter side was able to highlight the potential for other on-going education reforms outside of chartering—successfully portraying the new charter law as unnecessary . Charter proponents were finally able to push through a charter law via initiative in 2012. They benefited from a confluence of federal incentives for charter development through Obama’s RTTT initiative, and local issues with Seattle Public Schools undermining public confidence in the education system . But the expansion of charter schools to Washington state also depended critically on Bill Gates and the Gates Foundation, which had, since the early diffusion of charter laws in the 90’s, become a major supporter of efforts to expand charter schools. Outside of Gates, the charter initiative was very well-funded by the “usual suspects” in pro-charter philanthropy, including Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and Alice Walton of the Walton family . Broadly speaking, the politics of expanding charter laws to Alabama and Washington looked quite different from the early wave of chartering. For one, teachers unions were more aggressive in their opposition. But, the pro-charter side benefited from the support of philanthropists and philanthropy-funded advocacy organizations that had emerged in part as a result of the growth of charter schools in early-adopting states. This thus demonstrates the importance of the policy feedback framework for understanding shifts in the interest group politics of chartering over time. At the same time as charter advocates sought to spread charter laws and charter schools to new states, they were also defending and expanding bills in states with more developed charter sectors. In many of these states, initial charter laws included caps on the number of charter schools that could be authorized. As a result, continued charter growth required new legislation to raise caps—which benefited teachers unions and other charter school opponents in their efforts to curb charter growth. California was a charter school pioneer, adopting its initial charter law in 1992 just a year after Minnesota. By 2002, 350 charter schools had opened, and charter leaders were increasingly recognizing the need for greater coordination and political representation. This led to the formation of the California Charter Schools Association in 2003. Initially, the CCSA was focused to a greater extent on supporting new schools than on politics. At that time, charter opposition from incumbent education interests was muted—teachers unions saw charter schools as a “curious experiment”,not an existential threat. Teachers unions were much more determined at the time to prevent school voucher programs from taking hold. By 2013, with 1085 charter schools established and nearly 8 percent of total public-school students in charter schools, teachers unions had begun to push back more forcefully. And in response, CCSA grew into an organization with significant capacity for political advocacy—in part because it was able to raise a huge amount of foundation funding. While the unions had significant influence in the legislature, Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jerry Brown were both pro-charter, and would veto legislation they saw as harmful to the sector. Despite governor support, according to charter advocates, the regulatory environment grew more stringent over time, making it difficult for new schools to form and for existing ones to expand. This came to a head in 2018 with the election of Governor Gavin Newsom.