By allowing smoking when certain conditions are met, rather than all the time, these tactics are difficult to enforce and are ineffective.The industry employs this language when it seeks to combat popular support for smoking restrictions by delaying and weakening effective smoking restrictions.VFHF opposed all of these bills as inconsistent with the principles of smoke free workplace regulations because they did not protect all workers and customers from secondhand smoke. VFHF issued a fact sheet to legislators containing their reasons for opposing the bills, in which VFHF criticized all three bills for allowing indoor smoking, which had no safe level of exposure and which no practical ventilation system or interior division could render safe. They also criticized the convoluted enforcement rules, which stated that restaurants that excluded minors or were operating before a specific date could allow smoking. VFHF rightly pointed out in their information sheet that these provisions would frustrate enforcement and would fail to protect all workers and patrons.SB 1105 was sponsored by a VFHF stalwart, Sen. Ralph Northam , a pediatric neurologist who was committed to VFHF’s mission of supporting clean indoor air legislation.As introduced on January 13, 2009 it was a more pro-health bill than HB 1703, and in its original form it was supported by VFHF. Northam’s bill was filed at Governor Kaine’s request.It completely restricted smoking in any restaurant, bar, or lounge area. Proprietors were required to post signs stating “No Smoking” and to remove all ashtrays and smoking paraphernalia. Violators and proprietors would be fined $25 for violation. The bill also prohibited retaliation by employers against employees who filed complaints or sought prosecution of any violation of its provisions. In many respects,shelving rack systems this bill was similar to the provisions of other pro-health restaurant smoking bills introduced in 2009.
However, there were some important differences, mainly that SB 1105 as introduced did not have a long list of exceptions. There was no exception for smoking rooms or for private events at restaurants. The only exception was for outdoor areas; otherwise, smoking was entirely prohibited in restaurants and bars. It also differed from the strongest bill, SB 1057, by not specifically repealing local preemption. The language was identical to two other bills, HB 1692 introduced by Del. David Englin and SB 1160 introduced by Sen. Richard Saslaw , who was the Senate majority leader and also supportive of tobacco control measures generally.Englin’s bill, like Northam’s, was filed at Gov. Kaine’s request.Englin had considered carrying comprehensive language but decided to focus on the restaurant smoking issue in particular.VFHF supported these bills as introduced because they were consistent with their guidelines on adequate clean indoor air legislation, but not as actively as SB 1057 , which was a more comprehensive bill that comported with VFHF’s intention that “ALL Virginians deserve clean air.”SB 1057 was introduced by Sen. Mary Margaret Whipple , with the full and active support of VFHF, as the coalition’s official bill filed at their request.Whipple had been VFHF’s main patron for the 2008 legislative session, and she carried the most comprehensive smoking restriction language in SB 1057 in the 2009 session. SB 1057 prohibited smoking in any enclosed area open to the general public, including retail stores and restaurants, much like SB 1105. It also prohibited retaliation by employers against employees who filed complaints or sought prosecution of any violation of its provisions. It differed from Northam’s SB 1105 by additionally prohibited smoking in 80% of all hotel and motel rooms, and the common areas of multi-unit residential facilities. Whipple’s bill also repealed preemption, restoring local control. SB 1057 was an extremely strong smoking restriction bill when compared to its contemporaries.
It completely prohibited smoking in many workplaces that were not previously protected, and repealed preemption. HB 1704 was introduced by Del. Algie Howell, Jr. and was identical to Whipple’s SB 1057. Howell was considered a VFHF champion who had carried a coalition-supported bill in 2008, and so VFHF also strongly supported HB 1704 as well.HB 2067 was introduced by Del. Phil Hamilton , the chair of the House Health Welfare and Institutions Committee as well as the vice-chair of the House Appropriations Committee, which gave him significant power and influence in the House.HB 2067 was identical to SB 1057 and HB 1704, except that it did not include language specifically repealing local preemption because Hamilton felt that it would not pass the House if such language was included.Except for SB 1382, the bill containing a “minors provision,” which died in the Senate Education and Health Committee and SB 1160, which was identical to SB 1105 and was incorporated into SB 1105 by the Education and Health Committee, all the Senate bills passed the Senate Education and Health Committee, passed floor votes, and were sent to the House where Speaker Howell immediately referred them to the House General Laws Committee on February 4, 2009. Around this time, a closed-door meeting occurred between the Speaker Howell and Governor Kaine and his staff. No health groups were invited to the discussion. The meeting was the result of two factors. The first factor was the changing demographics in Howell’s district, coupled with the successful VFHF campaign to pressure Howell to support clean indoor air legislation. Howell intended to use a restaurant smoking bill both to show his constituency that he had acted on the issue and to take the issue off the table as a potential stumbling block for the upcoming November 2009 elections. The second factor was Kaine’s attempt to shape a political legacy. Democrat Kaine had been unable to secure any high-profile victories in the legislature and securing Howell and, by proxy, the House Republicans’ support would allow give Kaine a much-needed political victory. Kaine and Howell decided that they would support a bill that prohibited smoking in restaurants unless the restaurant employed a structurally separate and ventilated smoking room.
They left local preemption in place.VFHF and other groups who were likely to oppose the legislation, like the Virginia Hospitality and Travel Association, were left out of the discussions and not contacted for their views in a deliberate attempt to push the “compromise” proposal through before significant opposition could be generated. Because of this, the remaining groups opposing the compromise had very little political capital to attempt to change the course of events. Amy Barkley of TFK noted in a 2009 interview that “there wasn’t really anything [VFHF] could do except make sure that our four groups were standing strong and still publicly saying we opposed it … I don’t know how much more we could have done with those partners [who supported the compromise bill] to secure them.”Cathleen Grzesiek of VFHF said that the coalition had been caught by surprise by the negotiations on the compromise, having heard only rumors of meetings between representatives of Kaine and Howell before the announcement was actually made. VFHF only found out about the deal at 8:00 on Wednesday night February 18, the night before the compromise language was incorporated into the bill and did not see the actual language until 8:00 am Thursday morning,vertical farming system just two hours before Kaine and Howell held a press conference to announce the deal. Neither side had much time to react.She felt that Kaine, Howell, and the others involved with the compromise acted quickly so that “both sides [health advocates and hospitality/travel associations] didn’t have time to martial their forces.” VFHF immediately and repeatedly contacted the Governor’s staff and the chair of the House General Laws committee, Del. Jones, to attempt to alter the terms of the proposal, discussing their concerns about the compromise language and suggesting changes that VFHF could support.While Kaine’s staff and Jones listened to VFHF’s concerns, they did not make any changes to the compromise language based on VFHF suggestions.After a deal had been reached between Kaine and Howell, Kaine’s office contacted various groups to secure their support. Although VFHF was excluded from the discussions between Kaine and Howell, the Governor later reached out to some of the VFHF organizations who seemed likely to support incremental, not comprehensive, legislation. As a result, the leadership of the VFHF and its member organizations who supported comprehensive smoking restrictions played no part in what would eventually become the most significant action on clean air legislation in Virginia since 1990.
There had been some preexisting strife among VFHF member organizations and national health organizations over how comprehensive a bill needed to be for VFHF to support it.Some VFHF groups, including those who ended up supporting the Kaine-Howell compromise, were willing to support a less comprehensive bill in order to achieve incremental progress.This ideological divergence meant that, according to Carter Steger in a 2009 interview, some groups “[forgot] the real goal, which is protecting health.”National level advocacy groups who had been providing technical assistance to the coalition, and the VFHF leadership, were adamant that bills they were to support should be comprehensive.These internal divisions led some groups to split off and support the Kaine-Howell proposal when political pressure to compromise was applied.83 As Carter Steger put it in a 2009 interview, “the health groups … couldn’t evoke pain on the members [of VFHF] strong enough to prohibit them making the deal [to support Governor Kaine].”Amy Barkley of the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, in a 2009 interview, felt that this initial rift was exploited by the Governor’s representatives to prevent opposition, ultimately leading to the schism.The VFHF members that split off from the coalition to support the compromise included the Medical Society of Virginia, the Virginia Nursing Association, the March of Dimes, and the American Academy of Pediatrics Virginia Chapter.The Medical Society was supportive of the compromise bill with a spokesperson characterizing it as a bill that “would allow tremendous strides not only in reducing the number of deaths from secondhand smoke, but also from the diseases and illnesses that come from smoke exposure.”The Virginia Hospital Association took a neutral position, declining to support the Kaine-Howell compromise or the VFHF comprehensive bills, thereby effectively depriving VFHF of a coalition member. These groups were targeted by Kaine’s administration as likely to support the legislation and the administration even made some overtures to the core constituent groups of the VFHF: ACS, ALA, ACS, and TFK. Ultimately, Barkley said, the challenge VFHF faced in 2009 was attempting to convince legislators, the general public, and other coalition members that the Kaine-Howell proposal was not a “step in the right direction.”VFHF lacked the financial capacity to successfully educate Virginians about why holding out for a comprehensive bill would be preferable to backing the Cosgrove/Northam bills that were vehicles for the Kaine-Howell compromise language. Additionally, VFHF’s lack of grassroots depth meant that their actual influence with legislators was lacking.Barkley attributed this to a lack of resources committed to the coalition, not a failing of expertise.With limited resources committed to the effort and no forewarning of the deal that Kaine and Howell struck, the coalition leadership was not able to aggressively fight the compromise. In addition, the coalition was unable to counter the “buzz” in the media that surrounded the bill, which labeled SB 1105 and HB 1703 as a historic achievement in a tobacco friendly state. In a 2009 interview, VFHF co-chair Grzesiek acknowledged that the coalition leadership was aware of some of its shortcomings, and attempted to address it by applying for a Robert Woods Johnson Foundation Tobacco Change Policy grant in 2003, 2005, and 2007.Each application was rejected. Low levels of funding resulted in some organizational inadequacies; in particular, Grzesiek felt that an “executive director” role was needed for VFHF rather than the part-time co-chair person ships of the representatives from ACS, AHA, and ALA.Grzesiek stated that she and the other co-chairs had other responsibilities associated with their jobs that prevented a total commitment to VFHF.Another issue facing VFHF was a failure of some of the member organizations to fully commit to the terms of the “deal-breakers” agreement which was primarily a list of unacceptable legislative language such as red light/green light provisions, smoking rooms, and exemptions for venues such as bingo halls. While Cathleen Grzesiek recalled in 2009 that she was “comfortable that [VFHF] had a verbal agreement,” and had revisited the document in 2008 during the legislative session the fact was that the deal-breakers document was never signed.